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To put it directly, in the last section of his essay where Pro-
fessor Lippit offers his &dquo;own understanding of the development of
underdevelopment&dquo; in China, the author-with the innocence of
a first kiss-discovers the gentry and Confucianism. Possibly
there are yet some students of modern China to whom it is a novel
proposition that the interests of the mainstream of the gentry and
the Confucian ideology which protected them were inimical to
modern economic development. It is difficult to believe, however,
that the weight of that useful proposition is increased merely-
and this is all that Lippit adds for his innocent readers-by the
wisdom implicit in the words &dquo;class&dquo; and &dquo;relations of produc-.
tion.&dquo; Except for those incredibly isolated from useful books,
these sobriquets can hardly arouse now any sense of new
discovery.
Lippit’s major criticism of the various theories of under-
development, which he considers in the third section of his work
before offering his own discovery in the fourth section, is that they
are ahistorical, that they do not confront the question of how
underdevelopment develops. He encounters, however, both con-
ceptual and-as I shall indicate below-substantive difficulties
with the task of showing that underdevelopment was an en- ,-
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dogenous process experienced by the Chinese economy. Having
acknowledged that total output expanded and that there is no
evidence of any decline in per capita national product between
1400 and the early twentieth century, Lippit proceeds to define
underdevelopment in relative terms. &dquo;The principal referent for
underdevelopment then, in China as elsewhere, is not the decline
over time in a country’s per capita product, but its per capita
product in relation to the rapidly growing per capita products of
Western countries from the nineteenth century.&dquo; But such a &dquo;prin-
cipal referent&dquo; only carries meaning &dquo;elsewhere&dquo; when it can at
least be postulated that the growth of the advanced countries has
been significantly furthered by their economic exploitation of the
less developed ones.
There would immediately have been a further problem if the
author had here opted for a paradigm of underdevelopment pos-
sibly applicable to relatively small Latin American and Southeast
Asian nations, which became heavily dependent on international
markets, and attempted to lay the continental mass of China on
that Procustean bed. But he avoids such a misstep and correctly
concludes that the economic consequences of imperialism ins
China were ambiguous. (Imperialism-I have argued this else-
where-had powerful effects in China’s modern history, but
undermining the premodern economy was not one of them.) He
does resort to a hurried passage, curiously abstract, about the role
of &dquo;inequality in the relations between China and the West ... in
the underdevelopment of China.&dquo; Since the effects of the foreign
economic presence have already been discounted, this &dquo;does not
mean that the West and Japan took the leading role in creating
underdevelopment.&dquo; Lippit is thus aware of the difficulty of
applying the trendy notion &dquo;development of underdevelopment&dquo;
to China once the onus of imperialism has been lightened. He
retains, however, enough of a commitment to the concept,
whatever the facts for China, for him to borrow Andre Gunder
Frank’s title and to propose to answer with a single domestic
factor the question of why the Chinese economy &dquo;developed&dquo;
from being highly developed (in the Song dynasty, for example)
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to underdevelopment (in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
Only he accomplishes nothing of the sort. The fourth section is
no more than a static description of the late-Qing gentry in their
economic, social, and political roles. The evolution of the Chinese
economy from the Song to the Qing is relegated to a few pages (in
the first and second sections and a few hints elsewhere) which are
as barren of real economic history as this reader has ever seen for
paragraphs appearing under such a title as &dquo;A Thumbnail Sketch
of Chinese Economic History Since 960.&dquo; .
If there is a developmental process suggested at all, it is limited
to the almost offhand proposal that the post-Song gentry increas-
ingly incorporated the merchant stratum which during the Song
dynasty &dquo;still existed as a class distinct from the scholar-officials.&dquo; .
The gentry class &dquo;developed over the centuries by incorporating
within itself all of the separate groups that lived off the surplus
created by the direct producers.&dquo; Perhaps. But Lippit shows no
apparent awareness of the by now quite immense literature in
Chinese, Japanese, and Western languages which might either
support or contradict his suggestion. And, unfortunately, for the
nineteenth century-when underdevelopment mainly &dquo;developed&dquo;
-and later, the dominant process with respect to the gentry was
quite the opposite of what he proposes. From midcentury onward
and with increasing impetus we can discern a differentiation of
the gentry, as its sons (and occasionally daughters) took on the
roles of import-export merchants, manufacturers, bankers,
&dquo;modern&dquo; intellectuals (teachers, students, journalists, doctors,
lawyers, engineers), politicians (reformist bureaucrats, consti-
tutionalists, revolutionaries), and new-style military officers. The
main body, the majority, of the gentry retained its conservative
attitude-toward economic change and much else. But it was
these new social strata who were the dynamic actors at the end of
’ the dynasty and the beginning of the republic, and they were no
longer crudely opposed to economic development (or even to
social change within limits) on the grounds that it might threaten
their class interests. It is simply untrue that the probable rein- -
forcement of the power of the lower rural gentry by the centri-
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fugal results of the 1911 revolution was the major reason-it was
of course one factor among others-for China’s underdevelop-
ment in the twentieth century.
_ 
As will now be apparent, what troubles me about this essay is
not any serious disagreement with its principal theme, namely,
that the class and social structure of Qing China inhibited
modern economic growth, while some of the rest of the world
(Europe, the United States, Japan) proceeded varying distances
along the development road, with the result that China which
ranked as a leader, or at least an equal, prior to the Industrial
Revolution, and so on, was dumped into the cellar of under-
development. What does trouble me-and should discomfort
anyone who believes in the value of a deep and genuine under-
standing of the Chinese experience past and present-is the
enormous distance that exists between Professor Lippit’s mega-
historical approach and the need to come to grips with the
complex dynamics of China’s economy and society. Sustained
consideration of the historical evidence on any economic issue or
any event with possibly large implications for the economy is
usurped by polemics (admittedly quite mild), random anecdotal
history (such as historians themselves seldom perpetrate any
more), and the wide-eyed discovery of what is already widely
known. Take, for example, the &dquo;Thumbnail Sketch&dquo; to which I
have already referred. It is nearly unbelievable that these pages do
not even attempt to summarize the changes that occurred over
900 years in the principal magnitudes and institutions that are the
subjects of economic history: output and its sectoral origin,
income per capita and its distribution, population and its employ-
ment, land and its utilization, capital and its composition (in-
cluding technology), money and its quantity and circulation,
kinds and quantities of &dquo;social overhead capital&dquo; and services,
government revenue and expenditure, economic theory and
policy, and so forth. The remarkable economic expansion of the
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries-about which we now
know a great deal even if still not enough, and which would seem
to offer the possibility for valuable insights into subsequent stag-
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nation-is passed by in a few lines completely lacking in analytic
content.
Precisely this same innocence about China’s real economic
history informs Lippit’s critique of various theories of under-
development in the third section. He does indeed make some
useful sallies against those who might wish to rely exclusively on
any of these six explanations of China’s economic backwardness
in their most general forms. But the issue of &dquo;wrong&dquo; or &dquo;right&dquo; at
the level of abstraction at which Lippit remains, although it may
have its aficionados, is not the one that should properly occupy
the principal attention of any student who desires to go beyond
caricaturing Chinese economic history. The experience of one-
quarter of the human race-if only for its mass-merits genuine
historical analysis which penetrates beneath its notorious phy-
siognomy (even the most accurate caricature provides no more)
to a systematic, analytic, comparative study of its real anatomy
and physiology. What I mean, of course, is that all six of the
theories pummeled by Lippit are &dquo;wrong&dquo; in the sense that
accepting any of them as an adequate statement precludes
genuine knowledge (which also requires detail and idiosyn-
cracy) because each is so general that it obscures or abandons the
valuable insights-at some level of analysis-proffered by the
others. But if we accept with equal finality the &dquo;theory&dquo; offered by
Lippit in the fourth section, and rest content with his generalities,
we commit the same fault a seventh time. What is challenging in
the study of China’s economic history is not merely to label the
class and social structure of Qing China as obstructive to
development, but to demonstrate with as high a degree of
verisimilitude as possible the complex processes and institutions
by means of which the Confucian elite maintained itself, pro-
duced and distributed society’s goods and services, and fended off
economic and social change.
These are genuine historical problems of the highest order of
intellectual importance and moral relevance. But their pursuit
requires more than a justifiable sense of outrage at China’s fate-
and less justly at those scholars who are too ignorant or too mis-
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guided to understand simplified Marxism. To outrage must be
added useful theory and intimate acquaintance with the pro-
digious historical sources. The several theories of underdevelop-
- ment discussed in the third section, impotent as each is to explain
all, do however in some cases suggest the intervening mechanisms
(organisms? systems?) by means of which our Confucian elite
built and sustained their kind of society for so long. It is through
the analysis of such relationships, institutions, and processes at the
middle range and lower that we shall be able to link theory and
empirical data to achieve a more adequate understanding of
China’s economic and social history.
I doubt, for example, that &dquo;Preindustrial Stage Theory&dquo; (which
derives from Professor Rostow’s &dquo;stages of economic growth&dquo;)
was ever a very valuable analytic tool. But it does have the virtue,
which Lippit’s essay lacks, of acknowledging a distinction be-
tween premodern and modern economic growth. There is-I
would argue, and Lippit of course disagrees: &dquo;the rate of tech-
nological progress needed to assure growth in per capita product
was indeed quite modest,&dquo; he asserts without evidence-a qualita-
tive difference between slow and fluctuating growth of output,
and so on within a slowly changing (&dquo;traditional&dquo;) technology
such as China experienced over the centuries and &dquo;modem
economic growth&dquo; (under capitalism or socialism) as defined by
Professor Kuznets. Those conditions which conduced to pre-
modern economic growth from the Song to the Qing may have
been precisely the principal obstacles to modern economic de-
velopment. Thus from the point of view of &dquo;modern economic
growth,&dquo; a process which Lippit himself certainly agrees has
occurred in China since 1949, &dquo;underdevelopment&dquo; is .a charac-
teristic of all &dquo;traditional societies.&dquo; Indeed it may be the &dquo;nor-
mal» state of things on the scale of world history, so that the really
significant intellectual task is to account for the rapid develop-
ment of the West and Japan.
The &dquo;Vicious Circle of Poverty Thesis&dquo; as an explanation of
China’s underdevelopment errs as Professor Lippit points out in
greatly underestimating the savings potential-i.e., the surplus
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above subsistence requirements-of the Chinese economy. Al-
though a surplus in this sense must exist in general for the social
system to continue along its traditional path, it is nevertheless
possible-indeed inevitable-that at specific times and in definite
places both the supply of savings and the demand for investment
were inadequate for the purposes of sustaining or increasing
output. While conceptually a surplus always exists, in real history
the choices, frictions, and accidents of man producing and
consuming in a complex society may make Nurske’s formulations
quite useful tools for detailed historical analysis of real cases.
Take, for example, Professor Lippit’s estimate of the actual rural
surplus in 1933 as equal to 19% of net domestic product. He
assumes that after deducting the proportion of investment,
communal services, and government consumption attributable
to the rural surplus (4% out of a total of 5.8% of NDP for these
purposes in 1933), 15% of NDP was utilized forluxury consump-
tion by the rural elite, but might potentially have been available
for productive investment. Indeed some part of the rural surplus
was wasted in luxury consumption, but other parts were hoarded,
&dquo;invested&dquo; in real estate, or reloaned to peasant borrowers. The
principal difficulty with assuming a rural surplus above mass
consumption equivalent to 15% of NDP available for redistri-
bution in 1933 is that neither Lippit nor I have any useful quan-
titative data with which to estimate the importance of these
various alternative uses of the surplus. If, for example, net
landlord purchases of agricultural land and urban real estate,
hoarding of gold and silver, and consumption loans to farmers
were large, this in effect involved a &dquo;recirculation&dquo; of part of the
landlords’ income to peasant consumption. None of these was a
direct burden on consumption in a particular time period,
although in the long run, of course, they increased landlord
claims to a share of national income. Only the conspicuous con-
sumption of the wealthy, in particular their spending on imported
luxuries, thereby depleting the foreign exchange resources which
might otherwise have been available for the purchase of capital 
&dquo;




The experience of China’s agriculture in the first decade of the
People’s Republic should be evidence enough that while sub-
stantial social change may have been a necessary condition for
sustained increases in output, it was far from being a sufficient
one. Even with the post-1958 increased emphasis on investment
in agriculture, China’s farm output still lags. The problems of sup-
plying better seed stock, adequate fertilizer and water, optimum
cropping patterns, and mechanization at critical points of labor
shortage have not been easily met. In sum, the whole experience
of the first three-quarters of the twentieth century suggests that
only with institutional reorganization and large doses of ad-
vanced technological inputs could China’s agrarian problem be
solved.
This brings me to Dr. Elvin’s &dquo;High-level Equilibrium Trap.&dquo;
Again, it supposes-correctly-a major qualitative distinction
between traditional and modern economic growth, which Pro-
fessor Lippit explicitly-and incorrectly-denies. An exclusively
&dquo;technological&dquo; analysis of China’s failure to industrialize before
1949 is, as I have just stated, as unsatisfactory as sole reliance on a
&dquo;distributionist&dquo; explanation. We need both-and both carefully
pursued. In the present context, the high-level equilibrium trap
offers us one useful intermediate tool with which to understand
precisely how the class and social structure of Qing China actually
functioned at particular times and places to obstruct the passage
from premodern to modern growth. Merely to state that it did so,
because it was in the interest of the Confucian elite to preserve
what they had, and to go no further with an elaboration of the
actual historical institutions and processes by means of which this
conservative goal was supported and implemented is megahistory
unredeemed in its fecklessness.
Similar paragraphs might be addressed to the relationship
between social structure (including the kinship system of tradi-
tional China) and underdevelopment, the effect of imperialism
(see Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China in the
Early Twentieth Century), and the role of the Ming and Qing state
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and bureaucracy. But I have consumed enough space for the
rather simple point that I set out to make after reading Professor
Lippit’s &dquo;The Development of Underdevelopment in China.&dquo; Let
us undertake substantive studies of China’s actual social and
economic history which draw on all the theoretical resources that
we can muster and are based on full use of the enormous
contemporary sources that await sophisticated exploitation. We
already know that late-Qing and republican China was &dquo;poor&dquo;
and remained so while Europe, the United States, and Japan
developed their economies. And we have long understood that
both the bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic elite of this epoch
were part of the obstacle to modern economic growth in China.
Do we then know enough? Hardly. Deeper knowledge and
understanding, which will enhance us both intellectually and
morally, require an approach far different-and probably far
more difficult-than the one I have treated so unkindly in these
pages.
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